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Abstract
The paper studies monetary policy in an economy, in which the manufacturing sector is
ousted completely by the presence of a large natural resource industry. Thus, the economy
produces only non-tradable goods, which can complement or substitute imported goods, and
the primary shock to the economy comes from the fluctuations in the world price of the exported
commodity. A model of such an economy is calibrated using parameters relevant for Russia,
which is an example of an economy sick with Dutch Disease, and several conventional policy
rules are considered. It is shown that in absence of a well-functioning fiscal stabilization fund,
it may be optimal for monetary authorities to respond to the real exchange rate, as the Bank
of Russia allegedly does, using purchases of foreign reserves as the policy instrument. The logic
of these actions is to replace the absent fiscal stabilization policy. In case monetary policy is
conducted using an interest rate instrument, there should be no reaction to the real exchange
rate and only slight one - to inflation.
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1 Introduction
The “Dutch disease” has been a subject of great interest since around early 1980s (Bruno and
Sachs 1982, Gelb 1988). In an economy which suffers from such a problem, the industrial sector,
which can potentially compete with imports, effectively becomes ousted, as, for example, in the
model of Krugman (1987). The economy reduces to two sectors: the natural resource exporting
sector and a domestic service sector. All tradable goods, on the other hand, are purchased in the
international markets in exchange for the raw material export revenues. Furthermore, the non-
standard situation is that the domestic production of services is highly likely to be complementary,
not substitutable, to imported goods.
This paper addresses the observation that countries sick with the Dutch disease face a non-
standard monetary policy dilemma. A unique feature is that the primary exogenous shocks faced by
the the central banks in these countries are shocks to the price of exported commodity (usually oil or
gas), which can be considered supply shocks on the one hand (households can afford more tradable
goods without extra work), and demand shocks on the other hand (demand for domestically-
produced non-tradable goods and services is affected by the inflow of “petrodollars”). Most of the
domestically produced goods are complementary to the imported tradables, and improvements of
the terms of trade raise the relative price of domestic goods, leading to a real appreciation. Hence,
movements in the real exchange rate, which result from the fluctuations in the international price
of the exported commodities, signal not so much the degree of competitiveness of the domestic
goods, but rather the level of the aggregate economic activity, which is highly dependent on the
international markets. Therefore, in spite of the lack of a big import-competing sector, the real
exchange rate can still be a good indicator for the monetary authorities.
Another important feature is that countries vulnerable to terms of trade shocks frequently
adhere to international reserve management as an important monetary policy tool (Aizenman 2006).
Indeed, given the poorly developed financial and money markets in such countries, standard policy
tools, such as short-term interest rates, cannot be used. What is less understood, however, is that
purchases of foreign reserves is not just a monetary instrument – it is a fiscal instrument as well, in
the sense that by purchasing foreign exchange, a central bank removes resources, which could be
spent on imports. In this way, the central bank effectively taxes away a part of the income when
income is excessive or makes a transfer to the economy at the time when terms of trade worsen and
income falls. To the extent that financial market are poorly developed, consumers cannot always
borrow from abroad to substitute for this removal of resources. This tax is a standard inflation
tax, and therefore, it comes with a cost.
Russia is a good example of a country that seems to be stuck in such a situation. Both the
statements of the Russian central bankers and empirical evidence (Esanov, Merkl and de Souza 2005,
Vdovichenko and Voronina 2004) suggest that the Bank of Russia is choosing between inflation and
the real exchange rate (RER), instead of utilizing the more standard inflation-output trade-off.1.
1 At the same time, Calvo, Reinhart and Vegh (1995) show that the real exchange rate is a variable of interest to
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Furthermore, these papers also find that the policy instrument of the Bank of Russia is probably
the international reserves management. Hence, we will use the Russian case as the stimulating
example.
In Section 2 of this paper we build a simple model of a country sick with Dutch disease and
calibrate it using parameters relevant for the Russian economy. We then simulate the model
economy under several monetary policy rules, and demonstrate that the rule similar to that used
by the Bank of Russia (response to inflation and the real exchange rate) can help achieve lower
volatility of most real variables, most notably non-oil output and inflation.
Then, in Section 3 we discuss several important extensions. We first introduce an import-
competing manufacturing sector to the model, and demonstrate that the results are largely un-
changed. We then show that the optimal rule will change if the dominant shocks are assumed to be
to money demand. In such a case, inflation targeting is a superior strategy. We then demonstrate
that the monetary authority would not need to heed the real exchange rate if it could use a nominal
interest rate as its policy instrument — reacting to inflation would suffice. However, usage of an
interest rate does not help reduce the volatility of inflation and output. Therefore, foreign reserve
management may be useful even when financial markets are developed and other policy tools are
available. Finally, we argue that a stabilizing monetary policy would not be necessary if a perfect
fiscal stabilization fund were available, which would tax away all of the windfall export earnings at
the time of high export prices and use them at the time of low export prices.
In Section 4 we briefly analyze some recent Russian experience in light of this model, and then
conclude in Section 5.
2 The Model
The model presented here is highly stylized, and is constructed with the Russian economy structure
in mind. The model suggests that the only produced good in the economy is a composite of
imperfectly substitutable nontradables, whose prices are sticky. The economy also has a constant
endowment of a natural resource, which is sold at the stochastic world price in the international
market, in exchange for tradable goods. Only a fraction of consumers are allowed to smooth their
consumption and therefore the current account behavior depends entirely on these consumers -
others follow rule-of-thumb behavior, and consume their current labor income.
The assumption of no final goods exporting sector may seem extreme, but we argue that this
assumption is not overly unrealistic. Thus, well over 80 per cent of all Russian exports consist
of natural resources, mostly oil, gas, and metals. Of course, these sectors cannot be considered
pure endowment, since they employ a sizable part of the labor force, and, arguably, their output
itself depends on the world prices of the resources. However, we posit that as long as extraction
is not elastic with respect to short run fluctuations in the world commodity prices, and labor is
many developing countries, not necessarily those that export raw materials. Also, see Uribe (2003), who shows that
policy of RER targeting can lead to instability.
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not highly mobile across sectors, endowment is a reasonable approximation of the natural resource
sector. Most importantly, production in the natural resource sector is unlikely to be very responsive
to monetary policy. Finally, modeling the resource export sector as endowment is the easiest way
to generate fluctuations in the resource rent received by the country at the time of high commodity
prices, to which the monetary authority should respond.
The rule-of-thumb Keynesian consumption behavior can be justified by borrowing constraints,
extreme precautionary savings, or short planning horizon. The modeling of such behavior is bor-
rowed from Gali, Lopez-Salido and Voiles (2004), who demonstrate that the monetary policy rules
can be very different in the case when consumers behave according to a rule-of-thumb, rather than
purely according to life-cycle considerations. Even in developed economies, such as the USA, evi-
dence suggests that only about a half of households are permanent income consumers (Campbell
and Mankiw 1989), and this share is probably lower in countries with less developed financial mar-
kets and higher risks. Borrowing constraints and precautionary savings, as well as lack of trust
for all standard savings instruments, must dictate that consumers try to spend all of their current
income. It is easy to see in the statistics that imports in Russia grow very strongly at times of
high oil prices, which contradicts pure consumption smoothing. At the same time, capital flows are
also there. Therefore, it is likely that both types of consumer behavior is present in the Russian
economy.
2.1 Setup
Consumer behavior is modeled separately for the optimizing agents and for the rule-of-thumb
consumers, as in Gali et al. (2004). The optimizing agents, whose share in the economy is given by
λ, choose the optimal path for their holdings of international assets Bt. The value function V (Bt)
is defined through recursive utility maximization
Vt(Bt) = max
CoM,t,C
o
N,t,Lt
{U(Cot , Lot ) + β(Bt)EtVt+1(Bt+1)}, (1)
where CM is consumption of the imported manufactured good, CN is the composite of nontradable
goods (services), L is the labor supply, and
Ci ≡
[
(1− α) 1η (CiN )
η−1
η + α
1
η (CiM )
η−1
η
] η
η−1
is a CES aggregate of the two types of goods in the utility function. The superscript “o” denotes
that these variables are relevant for the optimizing agents, while the rule-of-thumb consumer will
be labeled by “r”. The superscript “i” means that the equation works for both types of consumers,
and the aggregate variables do not have superscripts at all. It is best to think about CM as the
manufactured good, although in this baseline case of the model this good can only be imported. In
an extension in Section 3.1, CM will be re-written as an aggregate of domestic and foreign goods,
which will be imperfect substitutes of each other.
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The felicity function is taken as
U(Cit , L
i
t) = lnC
i
t − v(Lit). (2)
This maximization implies an endogenous rate of time preferences β(Bt) (Uzawa 1968, Obstfeld
1981, Mendoza 1991). This is one of two standard ways to ensure a stationary steady state in
an open economy model, although usually the rate of time preference is made endogenous to
consumption, rather than assets. An alternative, frequently used in papers devoted both to business
cycle and monetary policy analysis is introduction of complete financial markets (Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan 2002, Gali and Monacelli 2005, Parrado 2004). We believe that the assumption of
complete markets is much less realistic than endogenous rate of time preferences. First, complete
markets imply extreme development of financial markets, which is hardly in line with the assumption
of rule-of-thumb behavior among a larger fraction of consumers. Second, complete markets shut
down the current account, which is a great cost to incur. Of course, endogenous rate of time
preferences is also a highly artificial trick, but the assumption that as consumers become wealthier
they become less patient (implying β′(Bt) < 0) seems not to be out of line. An informal anecdote
in favor of such an assumption could be the observation that once the Ministry of Finance of Russia
accumulated a large stabilization fund by 2005, the public pressure to spend this money on large
national projects intensified. Yet another alternative would be to assume that the interest rate
faced by the economy depends negatively on the net assets of the economy; the more in debt the
country is, the higher world interest rate it faces. Such a specification would yield exact same
equations in log-linear form as the endogenous rate of time preference.
The budget constraint for the permanent income consumers is standard:
Bt+1 = (1 + r)Bt +WtLot + P
oil
t X −Rt +Πt − CoM,t −
PN,t
PM,t
CoN,t, (3)
where r is the exogenous world real interest rate, Wt is the real wage in terms of tradables, P oilt is
the world price of oil, which will later be assigned an AR(1) process in logs, X is the endowment
of oil, Rt is the reserves purchased by the central bank, Πt is profit from ownership of firms, while
PM,t, PN,t are prices of imports and domestic goods.
The problem of the optimizing consumer is solved by inserting the constraint (3) into the max-
imization problem (1), performing the maximization and applying the standard envelope condition
V ′(Bt) = U ′(CM,t). The first-order conditions are
W∂U/∂CoM,t = v
′(Lot ), (4)
CoN,t
CoM,t
=
1− α
α
(
PN,t
PM,t
)−η
, (5)
∂U/∂CoMt = (1 + r)β(Bt)Et∂U/∂C
o
M,t+1. (6)
Here, the first equation is labor supply. The second equation is the intratemporal choice between
two types of consumption goods. The Euler equation (6) shows how endogenous rate of time
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preference leads to a unique steady state. If consumption is constant, then the equation reduces
to (1 + r)β(B¯) = 1, where bar denotes steady state value. The steady state value of Bt is thus
pinned down by the function for β(.). It is perhaps most natural to take B¯ = 0, although in
principle any other value is just as good. If we assume that β′(Bt) < 0, then, whenever the assets
Bt fall below the steady state level (the economy goes into debt), β(Bt) increases and consumers
become more patient. They start to consume less, and debt goes down. Correspondingly, when
Bt increases above the steady state level, so that the economy is a net lender, then β(Bt) falls,
consumers become impatient and spend the extra assets they have, again driving Bt back to the
steady state level. Thus, condition β′(Bt) < 0 makes the steady state not only unique, but also
stationary.
Now let us turn towards rule-of-thumb consumers. All of the intratemporal conditions are the
same for them (choice between the two consumption goods and leisure in each period). The only
difference is that they simply maximize one-period felicity (2) subject to the constraint that their
consumption must equal labor earnings plus the oil transfers in that period and the profits from
firm ownership:
PM,tC
r
M,t + PN,tC
r
N,t = PM,t(WtL
r
t + P
oil
t X −Rt +Πt),
and the constraint that their consumption of imports is simply equal to their share of the oil
revenues:
CrM,t = P
oil
t X −Rt.
Note that together these two constraints imply that the non-tradable consumption equals labor
earnings and profits.
Individual demand for both types of consumption in each period is given by expressions
CiN = (1− α)
(
PN
P
)−η
Ci, (7)
CiM = α
(
PM
P
)−η
Ci, (8)
where P ≡
[
(1− α)P 1−ηN + αP 1−ηM
] 1
1−η is the CPI.
Aggregation implies that the overall levels of consumption and labor in the economy equal to
the weighted average of the two types, with weights λ and (1− λ):
CM = λCoM + (1− λ)CrM , (9)
CN = λCoN + (1− λ)CrN , (10)
L = λLo + (1− λ)Lr. (11)
Production of nontradables is given by
CN = Lγ/γ, (12)
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where we implicitly impose a condition that production and consumption of nontradables must be
equal. In further analysis, we will often take γ = 1 for simplicity, which gives us constant returns
to scale technology.
Monetary policy, in terms of accumulation of reserves, consists of taking out a fraction µt of all
export revenues in each period:
Rt = µtPoil,tX, (13)
where Poil,t is the world price of the natural resource (oil), X is the constant endowment of oil,
and Rt is the amount of foreign reserves purchased by the central bank. In further analysis, we
normalize the endowment of exports to unity, X∗ = 1.
Money demand is given by a simple consumption-based quantity equation
Mt = PM,tCM,t + PN,tCN,t, (14)
and money is introduced into the economy via purchases of foreign exchange:
∆Mt = RtPM,t. (15)
This set-up completes the model, with exception of price behavior of nontradables, which will
be introduced later as in Calvo (1983).
2.2 Linearization around the steady state
Since the model is characterized by a unique steady state, it is possible to derive a system of
linearized equations, which approximate the behavior close to the steady state. It makes sense to
make the following normalizations, in order to simplify the solution: B¯, R¯ = 0, P¯N
P¯M
= 1, C¯M =
1, X = 1. Then we arrive to the following system:
1. Dynamic equations
The material balance condition
Bt+1 = (1 + r)
[
Bt + (1− µt)P oilt X − CM,t
]
is linearized trivially to
bt+1 = (1 + r)[bt + poilt − µt − cM,t] (16)
Here, small letters denote log deviations of the corresponding variables from the steady state. Since
B¯ = 0, the deviation of assets is defined as bt ≡ dBt/C¯M , that is, in percent to steady state export
revenue.
The Euler equation (6) for optimizers is linearized to be:
(1−η)(1−α)(pN,t−pM,t)+CoM,t = −
β′(0)
β(0)
bt+Et
[
(1− η)(1− α)(pN,t+1 − pM,t+1) + coM,t+1
]
, (17)
where we used the upcoming equation (21) to express relative consumption through the RER.
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The terms of trade are assumed to follow a persistent AR(1) process
poilt = ρp
oil
t−1 + εt. (18)
For now, we assume that the shocks to terms of trade εt are the only source of uncertainty in the
economy, since the goal of this paper is to derive the optimal policy in response to such shocks.
2. Household intratemporal behaviour
Within one period, consumers maximize utility by choosing between two types of consumption
and leisure. The corresponding rules are equivalent for both types of households. The labor supply
is given by
wt − (1 + ηα− α)(pN,t − pM,t)− coN,t = κlot , (19)
wt − (1 + ηα− α)(pN,t − pM,t)− crN,t = κlrt . (20)
The intratemporal choice between the two types of goods is given by
coN,t − coM,t = −η(pN − pM ), (21)
crN,t − crM,t = −η(pN − pM ). (22)
Finally, the rule-of-thumb consumers have their tradable consumption equal to the available
resources in each period:
crM,t = p
oil
t − µt. (23)
Non-tradable consumption is then equal to the labor income and profit from firm ownership, and
the amount is already determined here by the rest of the first order condition.
The CPI (for purposes of estimating consumer price inflation) is defined as
pt = (1− α)pN,t + αpM,t (24)
where α = P
∗
MC
∗
M
P ∗C∗ is the parameter in the utility function corresponding to the steady-state expen-
diture share of the imported good in consumption.
3. Aggregation
Since at the steady state C¯oN = C¯
r
N = C¯N , C¯
o
M = C¯
r
M = C¯M , L¯
o = L¯r = L¯, equations (9)-(11)
are linearized trivially to
cM,t = λcoM,t + (1− λ)crM,t, (25)
cN,t = λcoN,t + (1− λ)crN,t, (26)
lt = λlot + (1− λ)lrt . (27)
4. Production and pricing
Export of oil is once again defined as endowment, hence, the only production takes place in the
non-tradable sector, where output is a simple function of labor supply:
cN,t = γlt, (28)
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where γ = 1 is the degree of returns to scale. Assuming constant returns to scale in what follows,
pricing is determined as in Calvo (1983) and is defined by the following system of dynamic equations:
pN,t = θxt + (1− θ)pN,t−1, (29)
xt = θ1(wt + pM,t) + (1− θ1)Etxt+1, (30)
where θ is the share of non-tradable firms adjusting the price at time t, and θ1 ≡ 1 − β(0)(1 − θ)
and β(0) is the discount factor of the price-setting firm.
5. Money market
Money supply is governed by the following rule derived from log-linearized versions of (13) and
(15):
mt = mt−1 + αµt. (31)
Note that to the first-order approximation, changes in the oil price and the exchange rate do not
influence money creation. This is due to the fact that in the steady state, there is no reserve
accumulation and hence µ∗ = 0. Such a result may be worrysome, and gives rise to the question of
whether first-order approximation is sufficient for the oil price, which ranged from about 10 dollars
per barrel in 1998 to about 70 dollars in 2005.
The linearized quantity equation (money demand) is
mt − pt = (1− α)cN,t + αcM,t (32)
The final equation needed to close the model is the monetary policy. We consider three types
of univariate policy rules: inflation targeting pit = 0, real exchange rate targeting pN,t − pM,t = 0,
and constant money supply (no intervention) µt = 0, as well as two hybrid rules, where the money
instrument responds to inflation and the RER, or to inflation and the output gap.
2.3 Calibration of parameters
The parameters picked for the model are shown in Table 1, and are meant for the Russian case.
The most important parameter is perhaps the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and
imported goods η. For the benchmark value, we take η = 0.67, which means that production is
complementary to imports. This parameter comes from Belomestnova (2002) and New Economic
School (2005), who estimate the elasticities of demand for Russian imports with respect to the
real exchange rate and income. At the same time, we also look at the hypothetical situation that
domestic product is a substitute to imports. Afterall, import substitution is often named the driving
force of the Russian growth after the double devaluation of the Russian ruble in 1998. Besides, this
experiment can be justified by a hypothesis that the central bank cares not so much for the service
sector, but rather for a however small emerging tradable goods production.
Parameter ρ is taken to equal 0.91. This number was obtained from a first-order autoregression
of the real international oil price. In such regressions, the exact coefficient is very sensitive to the
time period of estimation and varies between 0.90 and 0.97, but qualitative results of our paper are
not sensitive to the exact choice of value within this range (and even outside it).
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Table 1: Baseline parameter values.
Parameter Description Value
η Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported good 0.67 or 1.5
κ Inverse of elasticity of labor supply w.r.t. real wage 1
γ Labor share in production of domestic goods 1
ρ First order autocorrelation of oil price process 0.91 p.q.
A Share of domestic goods in total consumption 0.7
θ Probability of price adjustment 0.25 p.q.
β(0) Discount factor at steady state 0.97 p.a.
β′(0) Semi-elasticity of discount factor -0.0001
2.4 Results of simulations with one-variable rules: impulse responses
The system of equations presented above is solved using numerical methods. We present the results
of simulations as impulse response functions of both types of consumption, aggregate consumption,
and inflation under the three types of univariate monetary policy rules, associated with targeting
of one variable. For purposes of demonstration, we show the impulse response graphs for the case
when all of the consumers follow rule-of thumb behavior (λ = 0), since it is easier to see the intuition
when one assumes no consumption smoothing. The impulse responses were simulated using the
techniques and Matlab programs developed by Uhlig (1999) and are demonstrated in Figures 1-3.
2.4.1 No reaction policy
The results for monetary targeting (no intervention) are shown in Figure 1. Two graphs are
given, demonstrating the case when the two types of goods are complements (η = 0.67) and
substitutes (η = 1.5). These results demonstrate a benchmark case, and give logical results. Thus,
in both cases consumption of tradables (imports) increase one-for-one with the oil price increase.
Correspondingly, the amount of non-tradable production grows or falls depending on whether these
goods are complementary to imports. Inflation is negative at the time of shock, as imports become
cheaper in the sense that the nominal exchange rate PM falls. Consequently, as the oil price returns
to the long-run level, the nominal exchange rate gradually grows back, which means that inflation
is positive, although very small. Inflation of non-tradables prices is minimal, since money supply
does not change.
2.4.2 Real exchange rate targeting
Corresponding graphs for RER targeting are shown in Figure 2. Two things are immediately
apparent. First, graphs for the cases of substitutable goods and complementary goods are identical.
This makes sense, because with constant RER there is no relative consumption change. Likewise,
we observe only two lines on the graphs, because all types of consumption respond identically. Thus,
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we see only responses of inflation and output. What we see is an immediate positive response of
inflation: in order to bring the RER back to parity, the central bank buys reserves and issues
money, which causes prices of both types of goods to start growing. At the same time, it is clear
that the central bank does not buy up all of the windfall gain of “petrodollars”: consumption still
increases on impact.
It is noteworthy that with this type of policy temporary oil price shocks have a permanent effect
on nominal variables: the central bank continues to buy up the reserves until the shock dies out,
and the money supply ends up at a new, higher level. Correspondingly, prices also end up higher
than at the initial steady state.
An interesting observation is that the response of consumption is non-monotonic. The intuition
is easiest to see thinking about non-tradable consumption. At first, consumption jumps up fueled
by an increase in the money supply, while prices remain stuck at the initial level. Further, the
central bank continues to buy the reserves and adding extra money into the system, while prices
still remain low. Eventually, however, the oil price shock dies out, and each period smaller and
smaller amount of extra money is added, while prices continue to rise. At some point the growth
in money supply falls below the growth in prices, and consumption starts to fall.
2.4.3 Inflation targeting
Next, we show the graphs for inflation targeting in Figure 3. These graphs vividly show that in
response to an oil shock, both types of consumption jump up. Tradable consumption grows for
obvious reasons: there is extra export revenue. However, this increase is not proportional to the
shock, since in order to prevent the cheapening of the foreign currency, the central bank adds money
to the economy by buying some of the extra dollars, which could potentially be spent on imports.
This extra money stimulates production of non-tradables as well, since their prices are sticky. The
RER appreciates. After the increase of the money supply, prices of non-tradables want to grow,
which forces the central bank to start decreasing the money supply back to fight the inflation. The
resultant sales of foreign reserves temporarily increase tradable consumption even further, and to
the extent that non-tradables are complementary, their production grows as well.
2.5 Hybrid rules
The rules presented above are all overly simplistic in the sense that each of them uses just one
variable. At the same time, it has been acknowledged in the literature that targeting only one
variable frequently leads to extreme volatility in other variables (Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1999).
Hence, we now turn to the situation when the central bank follows a hybrid rule, responding
simultaneously to two variables. Of particular interest are two rules: the rules allegedly followed
by the Bank of Russia, which claims to respond to inflation and the real exchange rate, and the
analogue of the Taylor rule with monetary base on the left-hand side.
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We for now concentrate on a particular form of monetary policy rule:
µt = −ω1pit + ω2(pN,t − pM,t), (33)
µt = −ω1pit + ω2cN , (34)
where ω1 > 0 and ω2 ≷ 0 are some coefficients to be determined endogenously. In these two rules,
monetary authority responds with a certain weight to changes in inflation, and with a certain weight
- to changes either in the real exchange rate or to domestic output. The exact weights are chosen
so that they minimize the loss function
L = V ar(cN ) + V ar(pi), (35)
that is, the sum of unconditional variance of output and inflation. Such a loss function is frequently
used in the literature (Rudebusch and Svensson 1999, Williams 2003), although is not derived
from an exact welfare criterion, as is also possible to do (see Woodford (2003), Chapter 6). The
reason why we do not use the exact criterion is that welfare as specified by the utility function
depends heavily on consumption, rather than output, and in our case, much of this consumption is
imported. Instead we posit that the monetary authority cares about stability of output, for reasons
that go beyond simple consumption smoothing. Thus, Aghion and Banerjee (2005) argue that
output volatility hampers long-run growth, especially in countries with poorly developed financial
markets.
Minimization of variance gives different values for the coefficients for different values of η and
λ, but generally the coefficients are both positive and the the one in front of inflation ω1 is much
bigger in absolute value than ω2. We now turn to comparison of the relative performance of these
different rules.
2.6 Volatility of variables and discussion
Following the impulse response analysis, the next step is to take a look at the estimated standard
deviations of the variables of interest under different policy rules. Table 2 shows these figures
for all six of the discussed policy rules. These figures represent the exact unconditional standard
deviations, derived from the VAR(1) representation of the whole system2, with standard deviation
of the shock εt normalized to unity. Minimization of the loss (35) was achieved by grid search for
the values for ω1 and ω2, which minimize the objective function. The value for the loss function is
shown in the last column of Table 2.
The table shows the results for two values of η, which correspond to the cases when imports
are substitutable and complementary to domestic product. Likewise, to study the effect of rule-
of-thumb behavior, we look at the standard situation of consumption depending completely on
2 The formula for the second moments of the variables in a VAR(p) can be found, for example, in Hamilton (1994),
pp.264-266.
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permanent income (λ = 1), as well as the case when most of consumer respond to current income
(λ = 0.30).
It is especially interesting to look at the standard deviations of output and inflation, since a
weighted average of these variables normally enters the objective function of the monetary authority.
However, we also report the volatility of imported goods consumption and the real exchange rate,
since arguments can be made that these variable need to be stabilized as well. It is easy to see in
the table that both tradable consumption and the real exchange rate are much more volatile overall
than inflation and output.
Not surprisingly, given our conclusions from the impulse responses, money targeting gives
smaller volatility of both non-tradable output and inflation than RER targeting, with baseline
parameter values. In all cases, money targeting gives smaller values for the loss function. Inflation
targeting comes close to money targeting, but still falls a bit behind for baseline parameter values.
Turning to the hybryd rules, the striking result is that the inflation-RER rules allegedly used
by the Bank of Russia turns out to be superior in terms of overall loss for all combinations of the
parameters, especially when consumers are mostly naive. In the base-case scenario (η = 0.67, λ =
0.30), the improvement over money targeting is achieved at the cost of higher output variability,
but the benefit is significant reduction in inflation volatility. However, it should be noted that the
optimal weight on the RER with this type of rule turns out to be rather small, and the optimal
rule is µt = 0.12(pN,t − pM,t)− 2.4pit.
An important result is that the inflation-output rule turns out to be about as good, more
frequently slightly worse, in spite of the fact that it is precisely inflation and output, not the RER,
which appear in the loss function. Hence, the inflation-RER rules can be argued to be superior on
the grounds of practical simplicity: the RER is much more easy to observe and react to than the
output gap. In this sense, the RER can be regarded as a useful indicator of the overall economic
activity, even in an economy, in which there is no import-competing sector.
We see that in the case when consumers follow the permanent income hypothesis, the dominance
of the inflation-RER rule over the univariate ones seems to be weak. Inflation targeting and money
targeting do about as well in terms of overall loss as the hybrid rule. An introduction of rule-of-
thumb consumers makes the case for heeding RER much stronger in terms of overall loss. This result
is quite intuitive: the case for an active stabilization policy is especially strong when consumers
fail to do their consumption smoothing themselves. If they behave as perfect permanent income
consumers, on the other hand, they store all of the windfall gains from temporary oil price increases
abroad, without destabilizing domestic demand.
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3 Extensions to the model
3.1 Import substitution sector
One criticism of the above model is the lack of any sector that competes with imports - an in-
troduction of such a sector is standard practice in such models and seems logical. After all, an
important argument in favor of stabilization of the real exchange rate is precisely the stabilization
of import-competing sector. If one keeps the example of Russia in mind, it is frequently believed
that the 1998 devaluation of the ruble stimulated domestic production, and thus pulled the country
out of the slump.
Hence, here we extend the basic model to see how the introduction of such a sector would change
the results. We proceed by assuming that what was regarded to be the manufactured import CM
is now a composite of imported foreign good CF and a domestic imperfect substitute CH :
CM =
[
(1− φ) 1ν (CH)
ν−1
ν + φ
1
ν (CF )
ν−1
ν
] ν
ν−1
, (36)
where it is assumed that ν > 1 so that the two goods are substitutes. Hence, households consume
services CN and manufactured goods CM , produced both domestically (CH) and abroad (CF ).
Following the paradigm that domestic exports consist solely of raw materials, it is assumed that
domestic manufactured goods is non-tradable internationally, so its production equals consumption,
and the production function is identical to that of CN :
CH = LHγ/γ,
where LH is the share of labor that goes towards the manufactured good. Correspondingly, the
service sector now employs only LN , and L = LN +LH is the total labor supply. Labor flows freely
across sectors, providing for a common wage rate. The sticky price processes for the services and
manufactured goods are also assumed identical and described by equations (29-30).
Such assumptions about identical cost and price adjustment structure in the two sectors greatly
simplifies the model, because the price levels in the two sectors must be equal to each other. The
prices at the steady state are determined by the same mark-up over the marginal cost (the wage),
while between the steady states they move according to the same law of motion. Hence, PH = PN
at all times. It is then sensible to define the real exchange rate as PN/PF . It should be noted that
since
PM =
[
(1− φ)P 1−νH + φP 1−νF
] 1
1−ν ,
PN/PM can be easily expressed via PN/PF . In log-linear form (now normalizing P¯N/P¯F = 1 at
the steady state)
pN − pM = φ(pN − pF ).
Hence, all relative prices can be expressed via pN − pF .
14
All of the first-order conditions are derived analogously to the baseline model, and specifically,
consumption of different types of goods relate to each other via expressions
ciN − ciM = −ηφ(pN − pF ), (37)
ciH − ciF = −ν(pN − pF ), (38)
ciM = (1− φ)ciH + φciF . (39)
and the material balance conditions now become:
bt+1 = (1 + r)[bt + poilt − µt − cM,t], (40)
crF,t = p
oil
t − µt. (41)
Calibration of parameters is similar to that given in Table 1, with the exception that α = 0.5,
φ = 0.5, η = 0.4, ν = 2. Thus, it is assumed that manufactured goods are about half of the whole
consumption aggregate and about half of the manufactured goods are foreign.
Note that the baseline model is a special limiting case of the model with the substitution sector
described here. Thus, if one sets φ = 1 then CM = CF and we are back to the model we had before
- the import substitution sector vanishes.
Let us now compare the results with different monetary policy rules, which are given in Table 3.
In the table, output is defined as 1−α1−αφcN +
α(1−φ)
1−αφ cH , where
1−α
1−αφ and
α(1−φ)
1−αφ are the steady-state
shares of the corresponding sectors in total production.
A remarkable observation from Table 3 is that the case for reacting to the real exchange rate
is actually weakened, not strengthened, in presence of import substitution sector. Thus, losses
from rigid targeting of the real exchange rate seem to be much higher in this case, while losses
from any other policy seem lower than in the Table 2. The rule of reacting to both inflation and
the RER seems to bring the lowest value of the loss function still, but the optimal weight on
the RER is the same as before. In fact, for the baseline case with λ = 0.3 the optimal rule is
µt = 0.12(pN,t − pF,t) − 3.0pit, whereas in the baseline model of Section 2 the optimal rule was
µt = 0.12(pN,t − pM,t) − 2.4pit. Even though the optimal reaction to the RER is very weak, it is
positive in both cases.
This result may seems striking because the presence of a substitution sector may seem to be
a good reason for paying attention to the RER in the first place. However, the intuition for this
result is straight-forward. The presence of two production sectors acts as a stabilizer, because a
real appreciation leads to an expansion in the nontradable service sector and a contraction in the
import-substituting manufacturing sector. These two effects balance each other out. However,
if the monetary authorities fix the real exchange rate, then the two production sectors have to
move exactly together by equations (37-39). Therefore, any shock becomes exacerbated by policy,
which forces the two production sectors to either both contract or both expand, instead of counter-
balancing each other.
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3.2 Money demand shocks
Although oil price shocks can be regarded as the primary shock for economies heavily dependent
on exports of oil, it is also interesting to consider what the optimal policy is in the case of demand
shocks. Table 4 summarizes results for different policy rules in face of this kind of shocks. Here, it
is assumed that a random shock is added to the money demand equation (32), and the shock also
follows an AR(1) process with the root 0.91. The economy is the one with an import substitution
sector, and the share of naive consumers is λ = 0.3.
From the table we see an interesting result that the winner among univariate rules seems to
be inflation targeting. The inflation-RER rules effectively reduces to inflation targeting, since the
optimal weight on RER is found to be zero, and the weight on inflation converges to negative
infinity. Adding output in the policy rule can improve things significantly, although this results
holds only in presence of an import substitution sector – without such a sector the output-inflation
rule is about as good as inflation targeting. Hence, the nature of monetary shocks seems to be
entirely different from oil shocks, and hence the optimality of the inflation-RER rule followed by
the Bank of Russia hinges upon the economy being resource-based and being subject to volatile
world prices for the raw materials the country sells.
The intuition for the optimality of inflation targeting in case of money demand shocks is the
following. Consider an economy without an import substitution sector. In the case of no response
to a positive money demand shock, domestic output takes a drop, according to the money demand
equation. Imports, on the other hand, remain close to the initial level (since flow of “petrodollars”
remains unchanged, as well as expectations of future flows). In order to make relatively lower
nontradable consumption an equilibrium, the real exchange rate needs to go up, that is, the domestic
currency (which is more demanded now) needs to appreciate. This happens via a fall in the nominal
exchange rate, corresponding to a short period of deflation.
Thus, any rule targeting the RER, inflation, or output improve the situation, because with such
a rule the central bank immediately issues extra money by buying up some international reserves.
As a result, import goes down, output goes down by not as much as with no reaction, the exchange
rates (both nominal and real) do not jump. In order to stabilize domestic output, it turns out to
be optimal to target inflation, so that prices of domestic goods do not change as much. This result
is similar to that in Parrado (2004).
Note that in this case it is not possible to offset money demand shock completely, as is common
in standard models. The reason is that an increase in money supply to offset the money demand
also leads to a build up of reserves with a corresponding drop in tradable goods consumption.
3.3 Stabilization fund
Another important extension to be considered is the interplay of monetary policy with fiscal policy.
Specifically, one can add to this model a stabilization fund, which would accumulate export revenues
at times of high oil prices, and decumulate whenever oil prices drop below a certain threshold.
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In the above setting, the easiest way to introduce such a fund is simply tax 100% of all revenues
above the average oil price, and return this money as transfers when oil price falls below average.
Such a tax is completely neutral, because it taxes a pure resource rent. At the same time, it removes
all of the stochastics coming from the oil price side, and the economy becomes identical to one with
a constant price of oil. Therefore, in combination with a stabilization fund, inflation targeting may
be chosen as the optimal strategy.
Note that such a policy is immune to a standard critique that fiscal policy is inappropriate for
stabilization purposes due to long implementations lags. Here, stabilization is achieved automati-
cally and the tax rate depends on the level of oil price. Such a policy to a large extent has been
adopted in Norway, and is being structured in Russia currently.
A perfect stabilization fund of this kind, however, is probably infeasible in practice, at a min-
imum due to uncertainty about stochastic properties of oil prices. Therefore, keeping in mind the
optimal monetary policy is necessary for a country in similar situation.
3.4 Interest rate based rules
So far, we have studied the optimal monetary policy when the only instrument available to monetary
authorities is purchases of foreign reserves. Here we demonstrate that this policy tool may be
optimal for all resource-dependent countries hit by terms of trade shocks, mostly due to the fiscal
nature of the instrument — purchases of foreign reserves replace the stabilization fund when a
proper stabilization fund is lacking.
To demonstrate the optimality of the international reserve management, we now consider a
more conventional monetary policy instrument, namely, a nominal interest rate.
The interest rate is introduced via the following interest rate parity condition:
it = EtpF,t+1 − pF,t, (42)
which says that, given constant foreign interest rate, the domestic interest rate is simply the rate
of nominal depreciation. Note that a constant interest rate rule corresponds to a fixed nominal
exchange rate. Equation (42) replaces equations (31) and (32) and we set µ = 0 in the remaining
equations.
We repeat the exercise in this paper with this interest rate as a policy tool. That is, we search
for the optimal rules of the form (33) and (34). Turns out that for a wide range of parameters η,
ν, λ, α, and φ the rule that maximizes the sum of variances of inflation and output is
it = 0.2pit. (43)
That is, it is optimal to respond only to inflation, and the coefficient on inflation is very small. The
only situation, in which it is optimal to respond to the real exchange rate as well, is if the non-
tradable sector of the economy is made small. This is understandable — in that case, stabilization
of output is achieved by stabilization of the import-substitution sector. But even in that case, the
coefficient on the RER is a small −0.1.
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The most important finding, however, is that usage of the interest rate as a policy instrument
leads to a higher overall loss. For the benchmark case with λ = 0.30 in the import-substitution
model the loss is 0.0089. This is higher than the 0.0049 that can be achieved using the purchases
of reserves (see Table 3). Hence, international reserve management can be justified as a superior
policy tool even for countries with developed financial markets, in the case that these countries are
suffering from the Dutch disease.
4 Relation to the Russian experience in 2005
The Bank of Russia clearly responds to the real exchange rate much more strongly than is prescribed
in the above analysis. For example, the Bank has failed to meet the inflation target for 2005: the
initial target of 8% was later changed to 10%, but the CPI grew by almost 11% according to the
official statistics. The common explanation has been the unusually high oil prices, which forced
the Central Bank to buy an unusually large amount of foreign reserves, in order to fend off the
appreciation. If such behavior is optimal, this means that an optimal policy implies an increase in
inflation after an oil price shock. However, the optimal rule derived above implies only a modest,
hardly noticeable, response to the RER. The comparative impulse responses with the optimal rule
and a rule that assigns an extra weight to the RER is given in Figure 4. The case is shown for
the model with import substitution sector of Section 3.1. In the upper panel the picture, the rule
is the one found is Section 2.6, which is the one that minimizes the loss. In the lower panel, the
weight on the real exchanger rate is increased to 1.
One can easily see that with the optimal rule, inflation still goes down for one period following
the oil shock, and then is back to around zero. The share of purchases reserves is about 0.25 of the
extra shock. If one increases the weight on the RER, however, then the share of purchased reserves
increases to about 0.35, and inflation rises in response to the shock by about 0.1%. GDP is clearly
less stable in this case as well. The only variable that benefits from such an extra weight on the
RER is the production in the import substitution sector CH . Hence, such policy can be justified
only if we think that the Bank of Russia cares specifically about the import-substitution sector,
or about the RER itself, for example, due to reasons outlined in Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and
Rogoff (2006).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered an economy sick with Dutch disease, i.e., an economy, in which all of
the tradable goods are purchased from abroad in exchange for revenues from raw material export,
and the primary shock to economic activity comes from the fluctuations in the terms of trade.
We have shown that in such an economy it makes sense to use international reserve management
as a tool to stabilize the economy, to a great extent because this tool has a fiscal feature, in the
sense that purchases of international reserves remove real resources from the economy. However,
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usage of this instrument makes sense only when a true fiscal stabilization fund is not available.
In case the international reserve management is used, the monetary authority should respond
primarily to inflation, but also to the real exchange rate. In such countries, the real exchange rate
serves not so much as a measure of the competitiveness of domestic good, but rather an indicator
of the level of aggregate demand.
Using an example of Russia as a country sick with Dutch disease, we have argued that the
optimal rule derived in our calibrated model is similar to the one allegedly used by the Bank of
Russia, which reacts to inflation and to the real exchange rate. However, our calibration indicates
that the Bank of Russia probably assigns too much weight to the real exchange rate in its policy.
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Table 2: Standard deviation of variables under different policy rules
Standard deviation of
η λ Output Imports Inflation RER Loss
Money targeting
0.67 0.30 0.09 1.28 0.05 1.78 0.0053
1.50 1.00 0.07 1.27 0.04 0.89 0.0031
0.67 0.30 0.15 1.78 0.26 2.44 0.0460
1.50 0.30 0.14 1.97 0.19 1.40 0.0267
RER targeting
0.67 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.45 0.00 0.1082
1.50 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.45 0.00 0.1082
0.67 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.59 0.00 0.2150
1.50 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.59 0.00 0.2150
Inflation targeting
0.67 1.00 0.14 1.27 0.00 1.75 0.0092
1.50 1.00 0.08 1.26 0.00 0.88 0.0035
0.67 0.30 0.31 1.73 0.00 2.22 0.0472
1.50 0.30 0.15 1.89 0.00 1.26 0.0117
Inflation-RER rule with optimal weights
0.67 1.00 0.09 1.20 0.05 1.67 0.0050
1.50 1.00 0.06 1.21 0.03 0.84 0.0022
0.67 0.30 0.21 1.63 0.13 2.14 0.0311
1.50 0.30 0.07 1.79 0.07 1.21 0.0049
Inflation-output rule with optimal weights
0.67 1.00 0.09 1.21 0.05 1.68 0.0051
1.50 1.00 0.06 1.21 0.02 0.85 0.0022
0.67 0.30 0.22 1.67 0.13 2.19 0.0316
1.50 0.30 0.09 1.94 0.06 1.31 0.0059
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Table 3: Standard deviation of variables in the model with import-substitution sector
Standard deviation of
λ Output Imports Inflation RER Loss
Money targeting
1.00 0.05 1.27 0.03 0.90 0.0019
0.30 0.11 1.97 0.16 1.41 0.0178
RER targeting
1.00 0.13 0.13 0.70 0.00 0.2546
0.30 0.44 0.44 0.89 0.00 0.4890
Inflation targeting
1.00 0.07 1.27 0.00 0.89 0.0025
0.30 0.18 1.92 0.00 1.29 0.0164
Inflation-RER rule with optimal weights
1.00 0.05 1.25 0.02 0.88 0.0014
0.30 0.06 1.88 0.08 1.29 0.0049
Inflation-output rule with optimal weights
1.00 0.05 1.25 0.02 0.89 0.0015
0.30 0.07 1.94 0.07 1.33 0.0053
Table 4: Standard deviation with money demand shocks
Standard deviation of
Output Imports Inflation RER Loss
Money targeting
1.00 0.08 0.47 0.73 0.6106
RER targeting
0.58 0.58 0.16 0.00 0.1821
Inflation targeting
0.41 0.88 0.00 0.37 0.0847
Inflation-RER rule with optimal weights
(Optimal weight on RER is zero)
0.41 0.88 0.00 0.36 0.0850
Inflation-output rule with optimal weights
0.15 1.18 0.19 0.71 0.0300
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